We study incentives for innovations that enable …rms to enter backward into the input market. Such innovations are disruptive in that they lead to structural changes and even reversal of supply-customer relationships. We …rst show that Arrow's replacement e¤ ect is also present in our vertical setting which gives rise to two general results: (1) vertical integration lowers the R&D incentive of the integrated downstream …rm; and (2) vertical integration raises the R&D incentive of the non-integrated downstream …rm. We then identify, respectively, situations for strategic integration, which is driven by the motive to preempt R&D of the target …rm, and for strategic separation, which occurs as a means to not trigger R&D by the downstream rival. An otherwise pro…table raising rival's cost strategy may not be chosen for fear of counterattack by the rival in the form of disruptive R&D.
Introduction
There are many real-life situations where downstream producers in vertically related industries enter backward into the upstream market as a result of internal R&D or by acquiring independent innovating …rms. For example, Apple Inc. had once discussed acquiring Imagination, a major supplier of graphics processors to the iPhone, but …nally decided to take development of graphics design in-house in order to reduce its future reliance on Imagination's technology. 12 On the software side, Apple had recently launched the mobile payment system Apple Pay, which is viewed by many as posing a direct competition threat to the incumbent Paypal, the dominant leader in on-line payment services. 3 Another case in point is that of Dell, which in 2012 created its software division, Lin (corresponding author): plin@ln.edu.hk, Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, New Territories, Hong Kong. Zhang: tianlezhang@ln.edu.hk, Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, New Territories, Hong Kong. Zhou: wzhou@business.hku.hk, Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong. We would like to thank Yongmin Chen, Avinash Dixit, Richard Gilbert, Patrick Rey, Tom Ross and participants at the International IO Conference at Zhejiang University and the AntiMonopoly and Competition Policy Conference at Renmin University for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors remain our own.
1 "The Apple discount", Financial Times, April 8, 2017 ; https://www.ft.com/content/3d49b76a-1b76-11e7-a266-12672483791a 2 Similarly, Apple had relied on its main competitor Samsung for the production of chips used in the iPhone and iPad, and was actively developing its own chips in alliance with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. 3 Apple Pay, linked with existing credit cards such as Visa, Mastercard and UnionPay, enables customers to make payments on their mobile phones at the point of sales in physical stores. See, e.g., "Apple Pay Takes on Paypal with Dell Software Group, based on a series of acquisitions that enabled Dell to enter into software and services businesses. 45 What a¤ects …rm incentive for innovation in a related (upstream) market? What are the e¤ects of such potentially disruptive R&D based entry on existing …rms in the related market? What competitive strategies might be available for a¤ected …rms to defend themselves against such threats?
In this paper, we study the R&D incentives of downstream …rms for innovations that enable them to enter backward into the upstream market (a type of cross-market R&D). In our model, two downstream …rms produce di¤erentiated products initially using an input supplied by an upstream monopolist. We consider mostly the case where only the downstream …rms can conduct R&D which when successful results in a new input of a higher quality, or equivalently at a lower cost, and enables the innovating …rm to enter the upstream market. A central feature of our model is the structural changes associated with post-R&D entry into the upstream sector and exit of the incumbent supplier if the innovation is drastic (which some would argue is the case for Apply Pay and PayPal). Incentives are measured by the willingness to pay for the new input. 6 We …rst consider the case where the market structure is exogenously given as one of two types: vertical separation, whereby all three …rms are independent entities, and vertical integration, whereby the upstream …rm is merged with one of the two downstream …rms. Our …rst set of results show that the downstream …rm's R&D incentive is stronger if it is a separate …rm than if it is integrated with the upstream incumbent supplier. Hence, vertical integration reduces the target downstream …rm's R&D incentive for developing new input. The results also show that vertical integration increases the R&D incentive of the competitor of the acquired downstream …rm. These results hold for general demand functions, regardless of whether the innovation is drastic, and under both Cournot and Bertrand competition downstream.
The driving force for these results is the replacement e¤ ect of innovation identi…ed by Arrow (1962) and the extensive studies in the literature on horizontal innovations, which says that a …rm's R&D incentive is inversely related to its pre-innovation pro…t (see, e.g., Tirole 1998; Reinganum 1989; Gilbert 2006a and 2006b ). If integrated with the current upstream supplier, the downstream's innovation on new input simply replaces its upstream unit's current business, whereas the innovation …rm is not concerned with replacing the upstream input supply under vertical separation. Similarly, integration between the upstream incumbent and a downstream …rm hurts its downstream rival because the latter faces a cost disadvantage with the integrated …rm in the downstream market. This decline in the pre-R&D pro…t for the non-integrating downstream …rm induces it to invest more in R&D that leads to not only self-su¢ ciency in the …rm's input supply, but also enables Long-awaited Functions on Websites,"Financial Review, 13 June, 2016; http://www.afr.com/technology/technologycompanies/apple/apple-pay-takes-on-paypal-with-longawaited-function-for-websites-20160613-gpia4f. 4 "Dell changes focus from hardware to software, services", Dallas Business Journal, Aug 7, 2013 . Since its creation, Dell Software Group has introduced many new products, including its Operating System 10 (OS10) which is based on a native, unmodi…ed Linux kernel that can support a broad range of applications and services from the Linux ecosystem. "S10 represents an interesting new direction for Dell as it continues to extend and enhance its networking portfolio with innovations in software and hardware," said Brad Casemore, Research Director, Datacenter Networks, IDC. Press Release, Dell, January 20, 2016. http://www/dell/com/learn/us/en/vn/press-releases/2016-01-20-dellraises-the-bar-for-open-networking. 5 Other examples include that of China South Rail Corporation, which in 2015 successfully developed its own technology for producing the Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistor, a core component in high-speed train system that used to be imported from more advanced countries. Toyota has developed a way to make hybrid and electric vehicles without the use of expensive rare earth metals that had to be imported from China. 6 This covers the cases where a downstream …rm enters backward into the upstream market by acquiring an R&D …rm, as is the case of Dell Software Group. the …rm to enter into the upstream market and drive the integrated …rm out of the input business (which we call the relationship-reversal e¤ect).
These general results enable us to further consider strategic incentives on the part of the upstream incumbent for vertical integration. We show that for certain R&D projects (to be conducted by a downstream target …rm or its competitor) (1) the incumbent input supplier can use vertical integration to preempt disruptive input R&D by its target …rm, which welfare is likely to decline; and (2) under some other circumstances it pays the incumbent upstream …rm to not vertically merge with its target …rm, so as to prevent input R&D (and the aftermentioned relationship reversal e¤ect) by the other downstream …rm; Put di¤erently, an otherwise pro…table raising rival's cost strategy (namely, vertical integration) is not chosen in our model for fear that so doing would invite counterattack by the rival in the form of disruptive innovation. The policy implication of result (1) is that authorities should be aware of the R&D related preemptive motive for vertical mergers. Regarding result (2), the traditional removal of double marginalization incentive for vertical integration, which is very strong in our model as in most vertical settings, is outweighed by the fear of the otherwise disruptive input innovation by a downstream rival.
We also consider the case of R&D competition where both the downstream …rms in our model can conduct R&D. A …rm's success rate increases with its R&D investment; if both …rms succeed, each …rm receives the patent with equal probability. Here, each …rm has two incentives to innovate: a standalone incentive (as considered in the early parts of the paper) and a competitive incentive (given that its rival succeeds). We …nd that the conclusion remains the same: for both drastic and non-drastic innovations, vertical integration reduces the equilibrium R&D investment of the integrated …rm and raises that of the non-integrated …rm. In addition, the strategic incentives for vertical integration and separation, as identi…ed previously, also exist under R&D competition. 7 Stimulated by the arguments of Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) on the relationship between market structure and …rms' R&D incentives, economists have devoted much attention to innovation in the past several decades. The central question is whether market power enhances or hurts innovation. However, most of the vast literature focuses on horizontal settings. Innovations that enable …rms to enter another tier of the vertical industry, e.g., backward to the input producing sector, have received little attention. Our paper is among the …rst attempts to study incentives for potentially disruptive R&D that lead to entry into the upstream market, and to show that the replacement e¤ ect identi…ed by Arrow (1962) also exits along vertical businesses of an integrated …rm.
This may be viewed as supplementing the Arrownian counter-argument to the traditional Schumpeterian view that larger …rms are more innovative. Most of the studies mentioned so far are conducted in a horizontal setting. Among the few studies of R&D in vertical settings, Chen and Sappington (2010) examine the e¤ect of vertical structure on process innovation conducted by upstream suppliers. They show that vertical integration generally enhances innovation when the downstream competition is Cournot, but can dampen it if the competition is Bertrand. The major force is that the upstream …rm internalises the positive externality of its R&D investment under V I. Our paper considers R&D by downstream …rms that lead to entry to the other level 7 In the Appendix B, we consider the pure innovation incentive by the upstream …rm to develop the new input. We show that, for a linear demand, the upstream …rm has a greater incentive to innovate under vertical integration than under vertical separation. Unlike the case of downstream innovation, upstream R&D is not disruptive in that the market structure remains unchanged following innovation. Thus, for upstream R&D, there is no structural bene…t to the innovator. As the upstream …rm innovates, the input price goes down which bene…ts both downstream …rms. This positive externality is partially internalised under vertical integration but not under vertical separation.
of the industry and thus structural change, and we also study strategic incentives for vertical integration/separation, both of which are absent in Chen and Sappington's study.
In a recent paper, Loertscher and Riordan (2014) consider a procurement model with competing upstream …rms that invest in process R&D and a monopolist downstream …rm that can source internally by vertical integration. The authors show that vertical integration discourages cost-reducing investments of independent upstream suppliers by creating a favoured, internal source of supply. As a result, vertical integration in their model, while increasing the R&D incentive of the integrated supplier, decreases such incentive of the non-integrated suppliers, which is detrimental to the monopoly customer. Loertscher and Riordan (2014) show that it may pay the monopoly customer to remain vertically separate so as to encourage innovation by upstream suppliers. Symmetrically, we consider innovation by downstream producers and show that vertical integration reduces R&D incentive of the integrated …rm but increases that of the non-integrated …rm. In our model, the monopoly upstream supplier may strategically choose not to integrate with a downstream …rm in order to deter R&D investment by the non-integrating downstream …rm.
Allain, Chambolle, and Rey (2015) study the e¤ects of vertical integration on downstream …rms' incentives to increase the quality of the …nal products. In their model, downstream R&D requires information exchanges with an upstream supplier, which may hinder downstream innovation if sensitive information is leaked to downstream rivals. Vertical integration reduces the integrated supplier's ability to interact with non-integrated competitors. In our paper, the reward for innovation is the (endogenous) extra pro…t that an innovator can earn, and the driving forces for our results are the structural changes brought about by downstream R&D. 8 The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets up the model and derives some basic expressions. Sections 3 and 4 examine standalone incentives for R&D of the integrated and non-integrated downstream …rms, respectively. Section 5 discusses strategic vertical integration and separation. Extension of R&D competition is considered in Sections 6. Section 7 concludes the paper. Proofs are regulated in Appendix A and the analysis of upstream innovation is provided in Appendix B.
Model
Consider a model of two vertically related industries: a downstream industry and an upstream industry. In the downstream industry, two …rms, D 1 and D 2 , compete with horizontally di¤eren-tiated products. The demand function for D i 's product is p i (q i ; q j ) , which satis…es the following properties: @p i @q j < 0 for i; j = 1; 2 and @p i @q i > @p i @q j for j 6 = i.
8 Some recent papers investigate the incentive to innovate in a vertical market structure when a downstream …rm can integrate backward through innovation. Inderst, Jakubovic and Jovanovic (2015) examine the shift of innovation activity away from manufacturers and towards large retailers and show that there is a hold-up e¤ect when upstream …rms innovate and a rent appropriation e¤ect when innovations come from the retailers. Chamboll, Christin and Meunier (2015) study a situation where a retailer may either choose to integrate backward with a small …rm or rely on a national brand manufacturer to product its private label.
The downstream competition can be in either Cournot or Bertrand fashion. Our main results are derived based on the general demand system. 9 The production of the …nal products requires a single input that is supplied by an upstream …rm U 0 with marginal cost of production c > 0. Initially, U 0 is the only supplier of the input. One unit of each …nal product requires exactly one unit of the input. The costs of transforming the input into a …nal product are normalised to zero.
There are two alternative market structures: vertical separation (V S), in which all three …rms are independent entities, and vertical integration (V I), in which U 0 and D 1 are vertically integrated. We refer to D 1 as the integrating …rm, and D 2 as the non-integrating …rm. Under V S, U 0 sells the input to both D 1 and D 2 . Under V I, the integrating …rm supplies the input to D 1 internally at cost and to the downstream rival D 2 at some chosen price.
Both downstream …rms have the capability to invent a new input that can be used in place of the one currently produced by U 0 . We refer to the new input producer as U n and assume that the new input has a higher quality than the old one. This quality premium can be transformed to a cost premium, 10 i.e., the new input is identical to the existing input but can be produced at a lower e¤ective marginal cost c d, where the cost di¤erential d 2 [0; c] measures the signi…cance of the innovation. After an innovation, there may or may not be competition between U n and U 0 in the upstream industry depending on the initial market structure. The upstream competition, if any, is assumed to be in price.
Let t j i denote …rm D i 's equilibrium pro…t under market structure t when …rm j is the innovator, where t = S (V S) or V (V I) and i; j = 1; 2. Firm D i 's pre-innovation pro…t (i.e., when neither …rm innovates) is denoted as S 0 i and V 0 i for V S and V I, respectively.
Downstream competition
In the downstream industry, suppose that …rm D i obtains the input at price w i and its rival obtains the input at price w j , and denote the equilibrium output and pro…t of D i as q(w i ; w j ) and (w i ; w j ), respectively. We assume the usual properties (they all hold for both Cournot and Bertrand pro…ts):
Note that w i and w j are endogenous, to be determined by market competition under either the V S or V I market structure.
Pre-innovation equilibrium under vertical separation_
Under V S, the two downstream …rms are symmetric, so U 0 charges the same price, w, to D 1 and D 2 for supplying the input: w 1 = w 2 = w. The derived demand for U 0 's input is thus 2q(w; w). U 0 solves the following optimisation problem:
9 For results on R&D competition in section 6, we will consider the following linear demand system: pi = a qi qj; i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j, where 2 (0; 1) represents the degree of product substitution. 1 0 This assumption enables us to avoid the complication of modelling how di¤erentiated inputs are transformed into di¤erentiated …nal products.
Let w S (c) denote the solution, and note that w S (c) > c. The two downstream …rms'pro…ts are
Pre-innovation equilibrium under vertical integration_
Under V I, D 1 and U 0 are integrated, so U 0 supplies the input to D 1 at cost c. Suppose that U 0 sells the input to D 2 at price w 2 . 11 The derived demand from D 2 for the input is thus q(w 2 ; c).
Receiving pro…ts from both upstream and downstream businesses, the integrating …rm solves the following problem: max
Let w I (c) denote the solution, which represents the optimal input price that a vertically integrated …rm charges to its downstream rival when the input production cost is c. Depending on whether the downstream competition is Cournot or Bertrand, the expression of w I (c) may di¤er (see the Appendix), but w I (c) always increases in c, which is to be expected. Once w I (c) is derived, the resulting equilibrium pro…t of the integrating …rm is then
and the pro…t of D 2 is V 0 2 = (w I (c); c). Remark 1 (Raising rival's cost e¤ ect of VI): w I (c) > c and V 0 2 <S 0 2 : Remark 1 is a form of raising rival's cost e¤ect of vertical integraton well studied in the literature (see, e.g., Ordover, Saloner, and Salop, 1990) . Vertical integration between D 1 and the upstream incumbent …rm raises the input price facing D 2 relative to that of D 1 , thereby lowering the preinnovation pro…t of D 2 . This e¤ect is beyond the result of Proposition 2 as well that on strategic separation (Proposition 3b) to be derived below.
R&D incentive by the integrating …rm
To study how V I alters a downstream …rm's incentive to innovate, we …rst investigate what Tirole (1988) calls "the pure incentive to innovate". That is, we assume that only one downstream …rm has the capacity to innovate: either D 1 (this section) or D 2 (next section). Section 6 considers the case where both …rms compete in R&D investments. 
Post-innovation equilibrium under vertical integration_
This problem is identical to (2) except that the input production cost is c d instead of c. Consequently, the solution must be w 2 = w I (c d), and the two downstream …rms' pro…ts are
, respectively, using the equilibrium expressions de…ned earlier.
Post-innovation equilibrium under vertical separation_
Suppose that D 1 and U 0 are initially separated. After D 1 invents the new input, it no longer needs to purchase the input from U 0 ; it produces its own input in-house. Under V S, therefore, input innovation enables the innovating downstream …rm to become vertically integrated. In addition, D 1 is now capable of entering backward into the upstream market and competing with the incumbent supplier U 0 in supplying the input to its downstream competitor, D 2 . 12 Given the cost advantage of the new input and Bertrand competition in the upstream market, D 1 is able to grab the entire input market by undercutting the incumbent supplier, U 0 .
Speci…cally, D 1 faces the following optimisation problem after its innovation: Choose the input price charged to D 2 , w 2 , so as to maximize its total pro…t from both downstream and upstream businesses, subject to the constraint that w 2 cannot exceed its upstream rival U 0 's unit cost, c:
This optimisation problem is identical to (3) 
whereas D 2 's equilibrium pro…t is S 1 2 = (w 2 ; c d). Note that under V S, the incumbent upstream supplier, U 0 , is always driven out of business regardless of the signi…cance of the innovation. The innovating downstream …rm not only obtains its own input but also supplies the input to its downstream rival. Therefore, innovation brings structural change under V S, but preserves market structure under V I as seen earlier. Also note that when the innovation is drastic, w 2 = w I (c d) and therefore 1 2 While obtaining extra business from selling its input, Un's participation in the upstream competition reduces the supply price that D2 pays for its input, thus hurting D1's downstream business. D1 may therefore wish (and claim) to refrain from entering the input market so as to keep its rival's cost high. However, such a claim may not be credible. Given the nature of Bertrand competition in the upstream industry, for any price that U0 charges D2, Un can undercut and grab the whole business. Such commitment issue (by a vertically integrated …rm to supply its downstream competitor) also arises in Ordover et. al (1990) , as pointed out by Hart and Tirole (1990) and Rei¤en (1992) . 1 3 Arrow (1962) has used the term drastic to refer to an innovation for which existing products or processes do not constrain the inventor's pro…t-maximizing price. See also Gilbert (2006b) . the post-innovation equilibria under V S and V I are the same. These results are highlighted in the following lemma.
Lemma 1:
Consider an innovation by the integrating …rm. (i) The innovation changes the market structure under V S but not under V I.
(ii) If the innovation is drastic, the post-innovation equilibrium is the same whether the original market structure was V S or V I.
E¤ect of vertical integration on D 1 ' s R&D incentive
We are now ready to compare D 1 's R&D incentives between the two market structures, i.e., to
We consider drastic and nondrastic innovations in turn. Note that V 1
; that is, R&D by D 1 under V I does not lead to any structural change and the innovation simply entails the replacement of the old input by the new input.
If the innovation is drastic, we have shown that the post-innovation equilibrium is exactly the same regardless of whether the original market structure was V I or V S:
Before the innovation, it is obvious that D 1 earns greater pro…t under V I than it does under V S:
One way to understand the proceeding result is to decompose D 1 's R&D incentive under V S into two parts. For drastic innovation, 
. If the innovation is non-drastic, the comparison between V 1 and S 1 is no longer so straightforward. After the innovation, the market structure under V S is similar but not identical to that under V I. In both cases, D 1 is the only upstream supplier and its own input is acquired at cost c d. The only di¤erence is that the input price charged to
, it helps to …rst look at the extreme case of d = 0. Under V S, both downstream …rms obtain their inputs at w S (c) before the innovation, and at c after the innovation (for D 1 , it it the new supplier U n 's cost c d = c; for D 2 , it is the old supplier U 0 's cost c). As the input price is lower, both …rms bene…t. In particular, S 1 1 > S 0 1 . Notice an interesting observation here: D 1 's innovation raises not only its own pro…t, but also D 2 's pro…t. In a vertical setting, therefore, a …rm may bene…t from its competitor's innovation, which never happens in horizontal settings.
When
That is, if the innovation does not reduce the production cost, it has no value under V I, as it does not change the market structure. However, such innovation is still valuable under V S because it enables the innovator to become vertically integrated with its supplier and thus obtain its input at a lower price even though the input production cost has not changed. To summarise, for both drastic and non-drastic innovations, we have the following result (the proof can be found in the Appendix):
Proposition 1: Vertical integration reduces the integrating downstream …rm's innovation incentive: V 1 < S 1 . For drastic innovation, the result can be explained by the replacement e¤ect, as the postinnovation outcome is independent of the pre-innovation market structure. For non-drastic innovation, the driving force is that D 1 's innovation brings structural changes only under V S, and is therefore more valuable there than under V I. 14 
R&D incentive by the non-integrating …rm
We now turn to the e¤ect of V I on the non-integrating downstream …rm's R&D incentive. Suppose that D 2 is the only …rm that can innovate. Before the innovation, D 2 relies on U 0 for the supply of the input under both V I (where U 0 and D 1 are integrated) and V S, and its pre-innovation pro…ts under the two market structures have already been derived.
Post-innovation equilibrium under vertical separation_
Under V S, D 1 and D 2 are symmetric, so D 2 's post-innovation pro…t as the innovator is the same as D 1 's when D 1 is the innovator: S 2 2 = S 1 1 . Speci…cally, the input innovation by D 2 transforms it into an integrated …rm that supplies the new input to its own downstream business at cost c d, and to its downstream competitor D 1 at either the non-constrained price w I (c d) if the innovation is drastic, or the constrained price c if the innovation is non-drastic. Note that the non-innovator's pro…t is also symmetric: S 2 1 = S 1 2 . 1 4 Our results are robust to other forms of contracting. For example, if the upstream supplier uses a two-part tari¤ to capture the entire downstream pro…t, the downstream …rm's innovation incentive is still higher under V S than V I. To see this, note that the innovating …rm earns the same post-innovation pro…t under both V S and V I. However, there is a positive pre-innovation pro…t for the integrating …rm under V I but none for the downstream …rm under V S. Similarly, if secret contracts would be o¤ered, the downstream …rm would earn less pre-innovation pro…t under V S and thus its innovation incentive would still be higher under V S than V
Post-innovation equilibrium under vertical integration_
Under V I after D 2 has innovated, there are two vertically integrated entities: one is between D 1 and U 0 , which produces the input at c; the other is between D 2 and U n , which produces the input at c d. If U n supplies the input to D 1 at price c ", where " is a very small positive value, U 0 S D 1 certainly accepts the deal. The sale also increases D 2 's total pro…t because its downstream pro…t is not hurt (w 1 = c and w 2 = c d in either case), and it now has some extra upstream business (as the supply price to D 1 , c, is greater than the marginal production cost of the new input, c d).
As a result, it is a dominant strategy for U n to supply the input to D 1 (at a price no greater than c), and D 1 accepts the o¤er. 15 In supplying D 1 , U n chooses the input price w 1 to maximise the sum of its pro…t from supplying its downstream competitor D 1 and its own downstream unit D 2 's business, subject to the constraint that this price does not exceed U 0 's own cost, c:
This optimisation problem faced by D 2 under V I is exactly the same as that faced by D 1 under V S, equation (4) . As D 1 and D 2 are symmetric under V S, this implies that when D 2 is the innovator, the post-innovation equilibrium is exactly the same whether D 1 and U 0 were originally integrated (the case of V I) or separated (the case of V S). After D 2 's innovation, the original upstream supplier U 0 , which is an in-house supplier for D 1 under V I and an independent supplier under V S, always foreclosed due to its cost disadvantage, but the mechanism of the foreclosure is slightly di¤erent between the two vertical structures. If U 0 and D 1 were integrated, their input production cost and hence the internal supply price are …xed at c, which is undercut by the new supplier U n . If U 0 and D 1 were separated, U n and U 0 engage in Bertrand competition in the upstream market, which drives the price down to a level equal to or below U 0 's unit cost, c. To summarise:
Lemma 2. Consider an innovation by the non-integrating …rm.
(i) Innovation changes the market structure under both V S and V I.
(ii) Innovation leads to the same market structure and equilibrium outcome regardless of the initial market structure (whether V S or V I) or the signi…cance of the innovation (whether drastic or non-drastic).
E¤ect of vertical integration on D 2 ' s R&D incentive
Given that D 2 is the only innovator, the net gain of a successful R&D to
under V I, and is S 2 S 2 2 S 0 2 under V S. According to Lemma 2, V 2 2 = S 2 2 , i.e., D 2 's postinnovation pro…t is the same regardless whether the initial vertical structure was V S or V I. D 2 's pre-innovation pro…t, however, is smaller if U 0 and D 1 were integrated V 0 2 < S 0 2 (Remark 1). As a result, D 2 's R&D incentive is stronger under V I than under V S:
We therefore reach the following conclusion. 
Strategic Integration/Separation
In this section, we extend our main model to consider strategic incentives of the upstream monopoly supplier in using vertical organisations to in ‡uence downstream innovation. In particular, we intend to make two points. First, under V S where only one of the downstream …rms has access to R&D, potential innovation may be deterred by a strategic vertical integration, which is mutually bene…cial to the upstream …rm and the innovating downstream …rm. Second, the upstream incumbent may choose to restrain itself from acquiring a downstream non-innovating …rm to reduce the innovation incentive of the downstream rival that has access to R&D. These results have important policy implications.
Strategic vertical integration
Consider …rst the possibility of vertical integration as a tool of deterring innovation. The market is initially vertically separate and D 1 is the only …rm with access to R&D. There is a …xed cost 
The bene…t of such integration to the incumbent monopoly supplier U 0 is that it prevents it from being driven out by the R&D product and entry of D 1 . The bene…t to the acquired downstream …rm that would otherwise conduct R&D is that it saves on R&D cost and is able to obtain the input (albeit old) at marginal cost. The independent downstream …rm D 2 is actually worse o¤. Absent of such integration between U 0 and D, D 1 would conduct R&D and be able to enter the upstream market with the new input, which would result in a lower input price that D 2 has to pay.
With such strategic vertical integration, the industry becomes (U 0 D 1 , D 2 ) with the old input and monopoly pricing on input by the vertically integrated U 0 D 1 . Absent such integration, the industry would also become integrated as D 1 enters the upstream market with its new innovation, either replacing the incumbent …rm or competing with it depending on whether the innovation is drastic. In sum, strategic vertical integration in our model deters downstream innovation and entry to the upstream sector, thereby necessarily reducing welfare (gross of R&D cost). Therefore, in contrast with the relatively lenient treatment of vertical mergers in the EU and the Unite States, our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should consider blocking such vertical mergers.
Strategic vertical separation
We now consider an alternative scenario where the target …rm for vertical integration does not have access to R&D, but the non-target …rm does. In particular, we assume that D 2 is the …rm with access to R&D, with …xed cost F 2 . As before, U 0 and D 1 are initially separate …rms and U 0 makes a "take-it-or-leave-it" vertical integration o¤er to D 1 . After D 1 's decision on whether to accept U 0 o¤er, D 2 decides on whether to innovate. Here, we consider the set of R&D projects such that 
Condition (8) is likely to hold when d is small. To illustrate, take an extreme case, d = 0. In this case, the innovation by D 2 is merely to take over the upstream production without any e¢ ciency improvement and thus, V 2 1 < S 0 1 . 16 Hence, (8) holds when d is su¢ ciently small. Note that under (7) and (8), the …rms contemplating vertical mergers choose not to merge, so as to deter D 2 's innovation that would disrupt the industry by driving U 0 out of the market and making D 2 a more competitive downstream …rm in competing with D 1 . We summarise the discussions in the following proposition.
Proposition 3(b). For an R&D cost such that S
2 and a certain range of d > 0, the upstream incumbent …rm chooses to restrain itself from acquiring a downstream …rm and the other downstream …rm chooses to not conduct R&D in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
It is worth noting again that absent of R&D, the incentive for integration is particularly strong in our model as it eliminates double-marginalization between the merged …rms (U 0 and D 1 ), and the resulting raising rival's cost e¤ect as mentioned in Remark 1, which give them a cost-advantage in downstream competition over rival …rm D 2 . The downside of such vertical integration, as shown above, is that it forces the downstream rival …rm D 2 into a corner which increases its incentive for input R&D that disrupts the industry by driving the input division of the integrated …rm out of business. The above proposition shows that such a negative impact to the upstream …rm and the downstream target …rm can be so huge that they rather choose to stay separate so as to not trigger such a disruptive innovation by the downstream competitor. R&D as a counterattack measure on the part of D 2 severs as a credible threat that can deter vertical integration by the incumbent supplier and its target …rm.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the above result is similar to a …nding in Loertscher and Riordan (2014) who consider a procurement model with competing upstream …rms that invest in process R&D and a monopolist downstream that …rm can source internally by vertical integration. Loertscher and Riordan show that, among other things, it may pay the monopoly customer to remain vertically separate so as to encourage innovation by upstream suppliers. They obtained this result because vertical integration, which will result in an internal supplier which the downstream customer can procure from, discourages R&D incentive by independent suppliers who anticipate their disadvantageous post-R&D procurement position vis-a-vis the internal supplier. Similarly, our model also identi…es a strategic incentive for …rms to maintain vertical separation, in an attempt to in ‡uence subsequent R&D activity by other …rms.
Another way of looking at the issue is through the value of commitment created by vertical separation. As Loertscher and Riordan (2014) point out, in their model, "vertical divestiture is a commitment to a level playing …eld that encourages independent suppliers to invest in cost reduction." In our model, vertical separation is a commitment by the upstream monopoly supplier to not discriminate against the independent downstream …rm (D 2 ) in its input price decision (by engaging in price squeeze). This commitment confers a level playing …eld in downstream competition, thereby reducing (eliminating in the model above) the incentive of the otherwise disadvantegeous independent …rm to conduct input R&D. 17 1 6 Formally, if d = 0, then V 1 7 In a model without R&D, Lin (2006) shows that strategic separation enables the once-integrated …rm to credibly increase its supply to downstream rivals, thereby reducing the market shares of upstream rivals.
Our result provides a new explanation for vertical disintegration as a way to deter innovation from downstream rivals. Such a strategic separation, similar to strategic vertical integration, may have a negative e¤ect on welfare because it may hinder innovation that would otherwise occur in the absence of such spin-o¤ and may also lead to double-marginalisations on consumers of the products of both downstream …rms, because without the spin-o¤, the innovating downstream …rm would choose to innovate and hence become the integrated …rm, eliminating the double markups faced by its consumers.
R&D competition
So far we have discussed how vertical integration a¤ects the two downstream …rms'R&D incentives, assuming that only one of them can conduct R&D. In this section we extend our analysis to the case of R&D competition, where both downstream …rms can conduct R&D that may lead to invention of a new input. Speci…cally, in the …rst stage of the game, for a given market structure (either V S or V I), D 1 and D 2 simultaneously and independently choose their investments in R&D. As in Allain, Chambolle and Rey (2015), the cost of R&D is assumed to be C( i ) for …rm D i , where
is D i 's probability of R&D success and is referred to as its R&D investment, with C 0 > 0 and C 00 > 0. The outcomes of R&D projects are independent between the two …rms. If only one …rm succeeds in innovation, the …rm is granted the patent for the new input. If both succeed, then each obtains the patent with a probability of one half. 18 In the second stage of the game, production and competition take place.
Recall the notation we have used so far: t 
Vertical separation
Under V S and given the R&D investments of the two …rms, 1 and 2 , the payo¤ matrix (gross of R&D costs) for D 1 and D 2 is
Given j , D i chooses i to maximise its expected pro…t under V S:
The …rst-order condition is . With the remaining 50% of the chance, D i 's successful R&D fails to win the patent, so there is no change in its payo¤. Thus, the competitive incentive for a …rm equals half of the di¤erence between its payo¤ as the winner and its payo¤ as the loser. The above …rst-order condition says that …rm D i 's R&D investment is optimal if the marginal cost of its R&D investment equals the marginal bene…t, which is a weighted average of its standalone and competitive incentives.
The two …rms'equilibrium R&D investments depend also on the strategic interaction between their R&D choices. Note that
Thus, the two …rms'R&D investments are strategic substitutes (under V S) if and only if S 0 i < S b i , i.e., each …rm earns greater pro…t if both …rms succeed in R&D than if none succeeds. As the two …rms are symmetric under V S, this condition is equivalent to S 0 i + S 0 j < S i i + S i j , i.e., the innovation under V S raises the two downstream …rms'joint pro…ts, which apparently holds. Therefore, under V S the two …rms' R&D investments are strategic substitutes, meaning that a …rm reduces its investment in response to its rival's greater investment.
Let ( S 1 ; S 2 ) denote the Nash equilibrium of R&D competition under vertical separation. We assume that the equilibrium is unique and stable. As D 1 and D 2 are symmetric under V S, we have
Vertical integration
Now suppose that U 0 and D 1 were integrated initially. The payo¤ matrix of the R&D game (gross of R&D cost) under V I is similar to that under V S:
Given j , D i chooses i to maximise its expected pro…t under V I:
The …rst-order condition is
Note that D 1 and D 2 are no longer symmetric under V I. For D 1 ,
and therefore
Intuitively, if d is small, winning the patent is not very rewarding for D 1 , while losing it to D 2 is still damaging. Then, D 1 's payo¤ is higher when no …rm succeeds than when both succeed. In that case, D 1 's R&D investment is a strategic complement of D 2 's investment, meaning that D 1 increases its investment in response to D 2 's greater investment. Of course, this is true only when the innovation is not signi…cant (i.e., d is small). If the innovation is signi…cant (i.e., d is su¢ ciently large), the sign of
is reversed, and D 1 's R&D investment becomes a strategic substitute of D 2 's investment under V I, as in the case of V S.
For
Thus, D 2 's R&D investment is a strategic substitute of D 1 's investment (i.e.,
< 0) if and only if D 2 's payo¤ is greater when both …rms succeed in R&D than when neither succeeds, which is likely to be true in general (it holds for both Cournot and Bertrand pro…ts under linear demand).
Assume there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in R&D competition under V I and denote the equilibrium by ( I 1 ; I 2 ). We have the following result: Proposition 4. When the two …rms compete in R&D, vertical integration lowers the R&D investment of the integrating …rm and raises that of the non-integrating …rm ( V 1 < S 1 = S 2 < V 2 ) if the innovation is drastic. For non-drastic innovation, the same is true if the demand system is linear and the R&D cost is quadratic.
The proposition says that R&D competition leads to the same conclusion as in the case of standalone R&D: vertical integration reduces D 1 's R&D investment and raises D 2 's. The intuition for drastic innovation is relatively easy to understand. R&D competition di¤ers from standalone R&D in two aspects: each …rm has an extra competitive incentive, and the two …rms'R&D investments are interdependent. If the innovation is drastic, the extra competitive incentive is the same for both …rms in both V S and V I (Lemma 3). Driven by the di¤erence in stand-alone incentives, then, vertical integration tends to reduce D 1 's investment and raise D 2 's. Furthermore, the two …rms' R&D investments being strategic substitutes, D 1 's reduced investment further raises D 2 's investment and vice versa. (For non-drastic innovation, the derivations are tedious. Nevertheless, we are able to show that the conclusion still holds when the demand for the …nal product is linear and the R&D cost is quadratic.)
In Section 5, we have shown that the upstream incumbent chooses to restrain itself from acquiring a downstream non-innovating …rm in order to reduce the innovation incentive of the downstream rival …rm. Under R&D competition, we obtain a similar result by numerical analysis. One immediate implication of the result is that U 0 and D 1 may choose to restrain themselves from vertical integration for fear of raising D 2 's R&D incentive. In fact, with R&D competition, vertical integration between U 0 and D 1 leads to two opposing e¤ects on the integrating …rm's pro…t.
On the one hand, the merge of U 0 and D 1 eliminates double-marginalisation which would give them a cost-advantage in downstream competition with rival …rm D 2 . This increases their joint pro…t. On the other hand, integration raises D 2 's R&D incentive, which negatively a¤ects the merged …rm's pro…t because the probability of D 2 becoming the supplier in the upstream is higher (Proposition 4). We are able to show that, under some parameter values, the latter e¤ect dominates and consequently, U 0 and D 1 strategically choose not to merge even if they have such an option. Put di¤erently, while having the option to raise rival's cost in the current product market through vertical integration, the upstream …rm chooses not to do so in anticipation of the counter measure (R&D) by its downstream rival.
Industry rate of innovation
We have established that vertical integration reduces D 1 's equilibrium investment and raises D 2 's investment. What about the aggregate industrial R&D activity? To answer this question, we use the probability of at least one …rm succeeding in R&D as a measure of the aggregate rate of R&D, or social rate of innovation, calculated as
To simplify the calculation, we assume that the R&D cost function is quadratic:
where > 0 measures the cost or complexity of R&D projects. We have the following result:
Proposition 5: Assume that innovation is drastic and the demand system for …nal products is linear. Then, for the above R&D cost fuction, there exists > 0 such that vertical integration lowers the industry rate of innovation ( V < S ) if and only if > (i.e., R&D is su¢ ciently costly).
The proposition states that vertical integration increases social innovation when the R&D project is not very costly, but reduces social innovation when R&D is costly. The intuition can be understood as follows. We have established that vertical integration reduces the R&D investment of the integrated downstream …rm and raises that of the non-integrated downstream …rm (Proposition 3). When R&D is not very costly (i.e., is small), D 2 's investment in R&D under vertical integration can be so large that its success rate is close to 1, so R&D is almost certain to succeed under V I, which is not the case under V S. When R&D is costly (i.e., is large), the intuition can be best understood by considering drastic innovation, although the conclusion still holds for non-drastic innovation. Roughly, the two …rms'total investment is determined by the extra joint pro…t the innovation can bring. Since the innovation is drastic, the post-innovation outcome is the same regardless of the pre-innovation market structure or who wins the patent, so the total investment must be inversely related to the two …rms'pre-innovation joint pro…t. Because vertical integration raises the two …rms'joint pro…t before the innovation, their total R&D investment is smaller under V I than under V S. Again, part of the bene…t of innovation is vertical integration; if …rms are already integrated vertically before the innovation, the joint reward of innovation is reduced, leading to a lower rate of innovation on the aggregate.
The result that vertical integration may enhance the social rate of innovation is particularly interesting. When investigating how market structure a¤ects innovation (mostly in a horizontal setting), existing researches usually consider the R&D incentive of a single …rm. 19 In this paper, we consider not only the integrating …rm, but also the non-integrating …rm. Since the former's incentive is weakened while the latter's is enhanced, we further consider the joint e¤ect, and …nd that market concentration can be conducive to innovation. Market concentration puts a non-integrated …rm at a disadvantage, and thereby gives it greater incentive to conduct R&D.
Conclusions
Cross-market R&D, which enables the innovator to enter related markets, has not received much attention in the literature. We study downstream …rms'incentive to invent a new input in a twotier vertical industry. Successful input innovation brings about structural changes to the vertically related industry as the innovative downstream …rm enters backward into the upstream market and competes with, or even drives out, the existing input supplier. We show that integration of the incumbent input supplier with a downstream producer reduces the R&D incentive of the integrated downstream …rm and raises the incentive of the non-integrated downstream …rm. The results hold for general demands and R&D cost functions, whether one or both downstream …rms conduct R&D, regardless of the degree of product di¤erentiation or the mode of competition at either level of the industry, 20 and for both drastic and non-drastic innovations.
Our model identi…es the structural changes that can be brought about by input innovation. In a vertically separated industry, downstream input R&D transforms the industry into an vertically integrated one as the innovating downstream …rm enters backward into the upstream industry. In a vertically integrated industry, input R&D by the non-integrated …rm leads to relationship reversal, whereby the innovating non-integrated …rm supplies the new input to its former supplier after R&D. When such structural changes take place, a …rm's innovation brings the bene…ts of both vertical integration and cost reduction. By contrast, R&D by an already integrated …rm generates only the bene…t of cost reduction, and is thereby not as attractive to the …rm.
The fear of structural changes caused by disruptive downstream R&D can produce strategic incentives for vertical integration as well as for vertical separation. We show that situations exist where an upstream supplier may takeover a downstream …rm so as to preempt its otherwise disruptive R&D that would overthrow the supplier. Likewise, there are cases where the incumbent supplier foregoes vertical integration with its downstream target …rm and instead commits and to remaining separated for fear of increasing the R&D incentive of the downstream competitor, despite such integration would eliminate the double-marginalisation between the integrating …rms and raise the cost of the rival. These incentives for strategic integration/separation have not been identi…ed in the literature, to the best of our knowledge.
One can relate our …ndings to the long-time debate between the Schumpeterian view of R&D, which states that larger …rms are more innovative, and the Arrownian argument, which stipulates that smaller …rms have stronger incentives for R&D because of their lower pre-innovation pro…ts. Economists have come to understand that both arguments have their merits and neither dominates the other in theory. Unlike the case of horizontal mergers, our model predicts that vertical mergers unambiguously reduce the R&D incentive of the merging …rm but raise that of the non-merging …rm.
In addition to being readily testable, these results push us to think deeper about the similarities and di¤erences between vertical and horizontal settings when investigating innovation incentives.
Our …ndings can help antitrust authorities in deciding whether to challenge a vertical merger. The model predicts that vertical integration reduces or even preempts innovation. When both …rms can conduct R&D, vertical integration may raise or reduce industry innovation depending on how costly the R&D is. Thus, such possible dynamic e¤ects of vertical mergers should not be ignored in antitrust enforcement. Also, the elimination of double marginalisation has been recognized as having a major welfare-enhancing e¤ect and hence used as a major defense of vertical integration. However, in innovative industries such a positive e¤ect can also be achieved through innovation rather than by vertical integration, as is the case in our model. Therefore, in assessing the competition e¤ects of vertical mergers, no integration may not be the proper counterfactual; one may need to consider the likelihood of vertical integration forced by disruptive innovation. 
is the value of the unconstrained optimisation problem (3), while S 1 1 is the value of the same optimisation problem with a constraint that the choice variable w 2 cannot exceed c (equation (4) Payo¤s when downstream competition is Cournot.
Suppose that the downstream competition is Cournot and the demand for …rm D i 's …nal product is:
where 2 [0; 1] represents the degree of product substitution. Given the input prices w i and w j , it can be shown that …rm D i 's Cournot output is q(w i ; w j ) = J , where is the normalised signi…cance of the innovation. Let A = (a c) 2 . We have the following pro…t expressions:
For non-drastic innovation,
Payo¤s when downstream competition is Bertrand. Now consider downstream Bertrand competition. The demand is given by 21 .
For non-drastic innovation, we have
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof proceeds as follows. We …rst characterise the equilibrium investments in R&D under V S and V I. Then, we provide a result (Lemma 3) on the competitive incentives. Finally, we show that vertical integration lowers the R&D investment of the integrating …rm and raises that of the non-integrating …rm.
Step 1. We …rst compare equilibrium investments in R&D under the two market structures V S and V I. The equilibrium under V S is solved from:
Similarly, the equilibrium under V I is solved from:
Since the marginal cost of R&D is the same across the two market structures, any di¤erence in equilibrium R&D investment must be driven by the di¤erence in the marginal bene…t of R&D, which, as mentioned earlier, is a weighted average of a …rm's standalone and competitive incentives. (i) If the innovation is drastic, a …rm's competitive incentive of R&D is independent of the market structure or the …rm's identity (i.e., V b
If the innovation is non-drastic, both …rms'competitive incentives of R&D are greater under V I than under V S (i.e., V b
. The proof is given as follows. By Lemmas 1 and 2, when the innovation is drastic, the postinnovation equilibrium under V I is the same as that under V S regardless of who the innovator is:
. That is, if the innovation is drastic, a …rm's competitive incentive is the same whether the market structure is V I or V S.
, and that under V S is similarly S b
1 , but is constrained by the independent U 0 for S 1 1 ), and
by Lemma 2 (when D 2 is the innovator, the post-innovation equilibrium is the same whether it's V I or V S), we conclude that
To understand the intuition of Lemma 3, recall that a …rm's competitive incentive is related to the di¤erence between its payo¤ as the winner and that as the los in R&D competition. If the innovation is drastic, the equilibrium is the same between V I and V S whether the innovator is D 1 (Lemma 1) or D 2 (Lemma 2). In particular, the vertical structure does not a¤ect a given …rm's payo¤ either as the winner or loser, and hence does not a¤ect the di¤erence between the two payo¤s. This means that for drastic innovation, a …rm's competitive incentive is the same whether the vertical structure is V I or V S. Now consider non-drastic innovation. For D 1 , its payo¤ as the loser is independent of the vertical structure (Lemma 2, as D 2 is the winner) ), but its payo¤ as the winner is larger under V I than under V S, where it has to compete with the incumbent supplier U 0 in supplying D 2 . As a result, D 1 's competitive incentive is greater under V I. For D 2 , its payo¤ as the winner is independent of the vertical structure (Lemma 2), but its payo¤ as the loser is smaller under V I than under V S, so its competitive incentive is also greater under V I.
Step 3. For drastic innovation, Lemma 3 together with Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that vertical integration lowers the marginal bene…t of R&D for D 1 and raises that for D 2 . Refer to Figure 1 for the two …rms'best response curves for drastic innovation, where the solid lines are those under V S and the dashed lines are those under V I. Consider …rm D 1 's best responses under the two market structures. If 2 = 1, D 1 's marginal bene…t of R&D equals its competitive incentive, which is the same whether it is V S or V I, so D 1 's two best response curves intersect at this point. When to V I, therefore, D 1 's best response rotates downward around the upper intercept (where 2 = 1). By a similar argument, moving from V S to V I, D 2 's best response rotates upward around the right intercept (where 1 = 1). Now consider the equilibrium R&D investment under the two vertical structures. Under V S, the two …rms'best response curves are symmetric and downward sloping. Moving from V S to V I, then, the two …rms'best responses intersect at a point to the northwest of the V S intersection, which means that D 1 's R&D investment is smaller, whereas D 2 's R&D investment is larger. Given that the R&D cost function is C( ) = 2 2 , the two …rms'best response functions under V S (which are symmetric) are determined by 
( 1 1 
The left-hand side of (10) . The V S equilibrium (i.e., the intersection between (10) and (11) 1 . However, for (12) and (13) to intersect within the range of 1 2 (0; 1) and 2 2 (0; 1), we must have > V 2 2 V 0 2 . It can be shown from both the Cournot pro…ts and the Bertrand pro…ts that V 2 2 V 0 2 > 1 . Therefore, 2 > s 2 . When the demand is linear (either Cournot or Bertrand in downstream competition) and R&D cost is quadratic, the intersection between V 1 ( V 2 ) and S 1 ( S 2 ) leads to a 2 that is above the V S equilibrium S 2 . It is then clear from Figure 2 that the V I equilibrium has a smaller 1 and a greater 2 than the V S equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. 1 + V 0 2 ) (S 0 1 + S 0 2 ). It can be shown for both Bertrand and Cournot competition that V 0 1 + V 0 2 > S 0 1 + S 0 2 . Therefore, h V h S > 0 when is su¢ ciently large, and as a result V < S . For non-drastic innovation, analytical comparison cannot be obtained. We resort to numerical simulation and con…rm the conclusion:
V > S when is small, and V < S when is large. Therefore, there exists a critical , below which vertical integration increases the industry rate of innovation. To …nd the optimal solution of w to the above problem, we …rst solve the subgame of downstream competition. In particular, given that U 0 supplies the input at price w, downstream …rm D i maximises (a q i q j w) q i . We can show that the quantity of input each downstream …rm demands in the symmetric equilibrium is q (w; w) = a w 2 + .
Thus, given q (w; w) , U 0 's optimisation problem becomes To understand the result, it is worth noting the following points. First, note that in this upstream R&D setting, there is no market structure change following innovation: after the innovation by the upstream …rm, the market structure remains V S (V I) if it was V S (V I) before R&D. This contrasts with the case of downstream R&D under V S, where the innovation transforms the industry to V I. In other words, for upstream R&D, there is no structural bene…t to the innovator. Second, in this upstream R&D setting, the replacement e¤ect of R&D exists under both V I and V S: as the upstream …rm innovates, it replaces the original pro…t regardless of the market structure. Third, there are positive externalities associated with R&D here: as the upstream …rm innovates, both downstream …rms bene…t as the input price goes down. This positive externality is partially internalised under V I, but not under V S. Hence, the R&D incentive of the upstream …rm is greater under V I than under V S.
